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NORTH DAKOTA
DEALING WITH DUBIOUS CONTRACTS FOR CONVEYING LAND
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR REFORMATION FOR MUTUAL
MISTAKE?
William P. Pearce
The topic of this Article arose from a recent opinion by the
North Dakota Supreme Court: Western Energy Corporation v.
Stauffer.1 The case dealt with how the law handles changes in
ownership of property, specifically land including underlying mineral
interests, that come into dispute after substantial periods of time have
passed, resulting in a need for the parties involved in the dispute to
turn to the courts for a solution. The passing of a substantial amount
of time often becomes the issue in resolving the dispute in these types
of situations.
The opening paragraph in the Court’s opinion in Western
Energy states that “Western Energy appealed from a district court
judgment finding its quiet title action pertaining to claimed mineral
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.11
1. 921 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2019).
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interests to be barred by applicable statutes of limitation and laches.”
Statutes of limitation are fairly straightforward and are discussed
below as they are the determinative factor in the case. However, the
specific goal here is to examine several of the approaches that can be
taken in this kind of situation and how the issue is ultimately resolved.
Raising the claim of “laches” is a rather vague concept, but it appears
in some of these cases and has an interesting background, as discussed
in the last part of this Article. The background of the case in question
will be laid out first followed by the discussion of several traditional
methodologies for resolving cases of this kind, generally, in the
context of other court cases.
I. WESTERN ENERGY CORPORATION V. STAUFFER
On May 25, 1959, members of the Eckman family, owners of
a tract of land, agreed to convey a portion of their real property to
members of the Stauffer family using a typical contract for deed to
accomplish the transfer. The contract for deed contained a reservation
of the underground oil, gas, and other minerals in the property in
question, which is not an unusual practice in the western part of North
Dakota where there are large underground deposits of these minerals.
The contract for deed was on a five-year payment plan, after which the
Eckmans were to convey the tract to the Stauffers by a warranty deed,
the usual document used for completing the transfer of land. The
actual conveyance of the property by the warranty deed was made very
early, in June 1959, rather than on a five-year plan, but the timing is
not particularly relevant to the case. However, the source of the
ensuing problem was that the June 1959 warranty deed did not contain
any reservations of minerals, although it expressly stated that the deed
was given “in fulfillment of the contract for deed issued on the 25th of
May 1959.”2
At this point, a potential problem came into existence because
there was an uncertainty regarding the status of the mineral interest.
The apparent agreement between the Eckmans and the Stauffers was
that 50% of the minerals were to be reserved, meaning they would not
be included in the grant of the land made by the warranty deed. The
statement that the warranty deed from the Eckmans to the Stauffers
2. Id. at 433.
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was made in fulfillment of the contract for deed appears to support the
passing of the mineral interests as well as the surface of the land, since
there was no actual reservation of minerals in the deed itself. Under
North Dakota statutory law, a conveyance of mineral rights in real
property grants all minerals except those specifically excluded by
name:
All conveyances of mineral rights or royalties in real
property in this state, excluding leases, shall be
construed to grant or convey to the grantee thereof all
minerals of any nature whatsoever except those
minerals specifically excluded by name in the deed,
grant, or conveyance, and their compounds and
byproducts.3
Since the warranty deed did not contain any mineral
reservation, or apparently any reference to mineral interests, it appears
to have conveyed all of the mineral interests in the tract in question to
the Stauffers. A conveyance of land that does not explicitly include a
reservation of minerals automatically includes the minerals that are a
part of the land unless there has been an intentional severance of
minerals from the land. Since the Eckmans did not include any such
reservation or severance of minerals in their warranty deed to the
Stauffers, the land with the minerals passed to the Stauffers. This
result has been clearly stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court,
following the established rule that a grant without a reservation shall
be interpreted in favor of the grantee, and “[a] conveyance of land,
without any exception or reservation of minerals constitutes a
conveyance of 100 percent of the minerals as well as the surface.4
A quiet title action was filed by Western Energy Corporation
in 2016 against a number of successors of the Stauffers. The Court’s
opinion does not does not specify the detailed basis for the quiet title
action, but apparently numerous conveyances, oil and gas leases, and
similar transactions were carried out by both the Eckmans and the
Stauffers and their successors between 1959 and 2016. Beginning in
1978, the Eckmans apparently began entering into agreements
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (2014).
4. Acoma Oil Corp. v Wilson, 471 N.W.2d 476, 482 (N.D. 1991) (citing Sibert
v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495, 496 (N.D. 1984)).
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conveying mineral interests, which they may have believed they had
retained and were entitled to when the warranty deed was delivered to
the Stauffers. Western Energy Corporation entered the picture in 1989
and 1990 by acquiring mineral interests, including mineral interests
that were all or portions of the interests the Eckmans had failed to
reserve in the June 1969 warranty deed. The Court does not specify
the various mineral interests in detail. However, the disputed mineral
interests must be the basis for the quiet title action, since the only
mineral interests that Western Energy would be seeking to obtain by
quiet title action against the Stauffer successors would be the mineral
interests that passed to the Stauffers via the original warranty deed that
contained no mineral reservation.
The Supreme Court opinion does not specify from whom these
interests were derived, but presumably it would have been from some
or all of the persons involved in the case in an effort to clarify the
actual ownership of the mineral interests in the land in question.
Although the action was nominally brought as a quiet title action,5 the
Supreme Court points out that the relief requested was not for quiet
title. Instead, it was actually for reformation of the warranty deed,
presumably because the deed did not contain a reservation of minerals
and was different from the original agreement.6 To successfully
establish a basis for a reformation of the deed would require that there
had been a sufficient mistake or mistakes to subsequently alter the
terms of the deed. The district court concluded that the discrepancy
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed itself was not
sufficient to establish mutual mistake that could support a reformation.
After several years, the situation had become more
complicated, so a simple reformation by inserting a missing mineral
reservation into the deed had become difficult, in view of all of the
various transactions. The Supreme Court, on appeal from the district
court, pointed out that numerous conveyances, oil and gas leases, and
similar transactions were completed by both the Eckmans and
Stauffers, as well as their successors in interest, during the period of
time between the execution of the 1959 deed and the filing of the quiet
title action in 2016. As stated above, the Eckmans conveyed mineral
interests to others, perhaps even interests that they may have deemed
5. See Actions to Quiet Title and Determine Claims to Real Estate, N.D. CENT.
CODE. § 32-17-1 et seq. (2010).
6. W. Energy Corp., 921 N.W.2d at 434.
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they owned, based on the agreement for a mineral reservation in the
contract for deed to the Stauffers.
In reality, the warranty deed should accomplish exactly what
it says it intends to do. If there is no reservation of minerals stated in
the deed, would that not mean that it was certain that no mineral
reservation was intended? Despite the action being framed as a quiet
title action, as noted above, the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognized that the relief requested by Western Energy was actually
to reform the warranty deed to comply with the original contract,
which contained the reservation of minerals.7 So, the issue that forms
the core of the case is: Does the law allow for changes, or corrections,
to be made in 2016 in a warranty deed that was created and delivered
in 1959? Not surprisingly, the answer in the Western Energy case was
“no”. The point of this Article is to look at a few of the more common
legal methods that may be used to attempt to seek a “yes” answer in a
case of this kind.
II. REFORMATION OF A DEED OR CONTRACT FOR MUTUAL MISTAKE
The Western Energy quiet title action set the stage for
establishing exactly who owns certain underlying mineral interests,
presumably including those originally owned by the Eckmans, when
there was no reservation in the warranty deed. This is the basic issue
brought forth in a quiet title action, which is “a proceeding to establish
the plaintiff’s title to land by bringing into court an adverse claimant
and there compelling him either to establish his claim or be forever
after estopped from asserting it.”8 Although the proceeding was
brought as a quiet title action, the Court shows that the relief sought
was actually to proceed with a reformation of the warranty deed. The
theory behind reformation of a document is that in the course of
creating it the parties inadvertently made a “mutual mistake.” If it can
be proven that there was a mutual mistake, then there is a basis for a
court to approve the document to be revised to correct the mistake. In
other words, the court can order the reformation or correction of the
original document to adapt it to the document that presumably was
7. See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis
of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 265 (1998) (reformation of contracts).
8. Quiet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (4th ed. 1968).
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intended to be created by the individuals who wrote it. Reformation of
a written document is an appropriate result when the surrounding
circumstances justify it. A court will grant relief by way of reformation
of a written instrument resulting from a mutual mistake, but all of the
circumstances must be taken into consideration:
Each case involving the reformation of a contract
on grounds of fraud or mutual mistake must be
determined upon its own particular facts and
circumstances. In considering whether or not a mutual
mistake exists, the court can properly look into the
surrounding circumstances and take into consideration
all facts which disclose the intention of the parties.9
If the facts and circumstances are sufficiently clear to justify the
granting of a reformation of the document or documents in question,
of course, the court would look favorably upon granting it, assuming
that the case is not more appropriately handled by a statute of
limitations, as in the Western Energy case.10
The North Dakota statutory basis for approving reformation of a
document is set out as follows:
When, through fraud or mutual mistake of the
parties, or a mistake of one party which the other at the
time knew or suspected, a written contract does not
truly express the intention of the parties, it may be
revised on the application of a party aggrieved so as to
express that intention so far as it can be done without
prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good
faith and for value.11
The lower court was not convinced that the discrepancy between
the warranty deed and the contract for deed—the reservation of the
mineral interests—was sufficient to establish mutual mistake. Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s conclusion was the same simply
9. Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143, 150 (N.D. 1980).
10. See Zabolotny v. Fedorenko, 315 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1982) (holding that
reformation was the most logical and appropriate resolution).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-17 (2010).
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because it would seem to have been peculiar and unlikely that the
parties would have not have noticed in examining the recorded
documents that there was a mineral reservation in the original contract
for deed but nothing of that kind contained in the warranty deed. In
fact, it seems relatively straightforward that the Stauffers ought to
have acquired the mineral interest since they received a warranty deed
that did not contain any mineral reservation and accordingly would
necessarily have transferred all of the mineral interests.
In addition to mutual mistake, it is possible in some cases for
fraud of some kind to have occurred, but there appears to be no
evidence of fraud having been a factor in the Western Energy case.
However, there could always be something that occurs other than the
sheer overlooking of some step in the process or transferring an
interest in land, and the person bringing the claim has the burden to
explain the problem. As the North Dakota Supreme Court has pointed
out:
A party seeking reformation has the burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that a written agreement
does not fully or truly state the agreement the parties
intended to make.12 The burden of proof rests on the
party who seeks a reformation to prove that the written
instrument does not fully or truly state the agreement
that the parties intended to make.13
Any case involving a claim for reformation of a document or
documents must take into account all of the relevant facts in any given
situation, meaning there is no standard scenario that will support a
reformation. Included in the concept of “relevant facts” in modern
times would be the possibility of introducing parol evidence, meaning
oral evidence rather than written evidence, in support of a claim for
reformation, but the standard for this is generally high:
The Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the use of
circumstantial parol evidence to prove mutual mistake
12. Dixon v. Dixon, 898 N.W.2d 706, 711 (N.D. 2017) (quoting Freidig v. Weed,
868 N.W.2d 546, 549 (N.D. 2015)).
13. Ell, 295 N.W.2d at 150 (citing Oliver-Mercer Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Fisher, 146 N.W.2d 346, 356 (N.D. 1966)).
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is noteworthy here. Initially the Court acknowledged a
high standard for use of parol evidence to prove mutual
mistake: such evidence must be clear, satisfactory,
specific, and convincing, and a court of equity will not
grant reformation upon a mere preponderance of
evidence, but only upon certainty of error.14
Whether a mistake exists in a document that would have been
sufficient to justify a claim of reformation involves looking at “each
case involving the reformation of a contract on grounds of fraud or
mutual mistake must be determined upon its own particular facts and
circumstances.”15
It should also be kept in mind when faced with a claim for
reformation that it is not always a simple matter to determine whether
there is a clear mistake in a contract:
The inconsistency of the decisions as to the effect of
mistake in contracting is due to the fact that AngloAmerican law is torn between the desire for stability of
commercial transactions and the feeling that is it unfair
to hold a party to a contract that he made without
complete information about all the relevant
circumstances. The latter consideration rests on a sense
of fair play which looks with disfavor on permitting
anyone to reap an advantage from another party’s
mistakes.16
Therefore, the essential basis for a successful action for
reformation of a document is that it must be shown by substantial
evidence that an actual mistake occurred in the creation of the
document that is significant enough that the mutual intention of the
parties to the document is not what was included in the document. As
the Court stated in the Western Energy case:
14. Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, Recent Developments in North Dakota
Contract Law, 92 N.D. L. REV. 19, 37 (2016).
15. Mau v. Schwan, 460 N.W.2d 131, 134 (N.D. 1990).
16. Ralph A. Newman, Relief for Mistake in Contracting, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
232, 236–37 (1969).
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Further, the district court concluded the discrepancy
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed is
not enough to establish mutual mistake. Because it
found that Western had not met the burden of proof to
establish mutual mistake at the time of conveyance, the
district court entered judgment quieting title of the
minerals to the Stauffers.17
To establish the existence of a mistake that would be sufficiently
important to justify a reformation of a document, the party claiming
the existence of a genuine mistake must prove there was a firm basis
for alleging the claim:
Here, the district court found numerous transactions
involving the property and mineral rights occurred in
the decades since the warranty deed was executed and
recorded. The district court found these transactions,
including a completed title opinion, gave all parties
reason to review the title record. An examination of the
title record would have disclosed the difference
between the contract for deed and the warranty deed.
The district court thus concluded that any alleged
mutual mistake was, or should have been, discovered
with reasonable diligence in 1959 when the documents
were executed, or in the intervening fifty-nine years
since the execution of the warranty deed.…A simple
examination of the title records would have revealed
competing leases on the property as well as the
discrepancy between the 1959 contract for deed and the
warranty deed.18
In Anderson v. Selby,19 the North Dakota Supreme Court also
held that there was no basis for a reformation action in a somewhat
similar situation to the one in Western Energy. The Andersons had
conveyed a parcel of land, reserving oil, gas, and other minerals, and
17. W. Energy Corp. v. Stauffer, 921 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2019).
18. Id. at 435.
19. 700 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 2005).
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they also intended to reserve a flowage easement. This easement was
a right to raise the elevation of the water table in connection with a
dam project in which the Andersons had offered the easement to the
United States Army Corp of Engineers in charge of the project.
However, the warranty deed from the Andersons to Selby did not
contain a flowage easement. The Andersons, not wishing to lose the
large payment they would have received from the Corps for the
easement, sued Selby, seeking a reformation of the deed to include a
reservation of the easement, which had not been included in the deed.
Selby denied that there had been a mutual mistake regarding a
reservation of the easement. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Selby on the Andersons’ claim, thereby declining
to grant a reformation. On appeal by the Andersons, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to
consider the matter:
Although the Andersons have the ultimate burden of
proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that
they are entitled to reformation because of a mistake
which Selby at the time knew or suspected, we believe
there is evidence in this record which supports an
inference that such a mistake was made. We therefore
conclude summary judgment was not appropriate on
the Andersons’ claim for reformation.20
In other words, it was a matter of the two different courts
viewing the evidence differently as to whether there could have been
a mutual mistake that could have supported a reformation of the deed.
III. WEHNER v. SCHROEDER: SOME SIMILARITIES TO WESTERN
ENERGY BUT A DIFFERENT RESULT
Another case, Wehner v. Schroeder,21 which was similar but
different to the Western Energy case, came before the North Dakota
Supreme Court in 1984. The plaintiff sought reformation of a warranty
20. Id. at 701.
21. 354 N.W.2d 674 (N.D. 1984). The earlier Wehner v. Schroeder case, 335
N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1983), ended in a remand which then led to the subsequent 1984
case.
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deed on the same grounds as in Western Energy—that a mineral
reservation agreed upon in a contract for deed had been omitted from
the subsequently recorded warranty deed. However, there was a
peculiar quirk because the 1950 contract for deed stated that the
“second parties,” the Schroeders, who were the grantees in the deed,
“retain 50% of all oil, gas and minerals on said land.” The peculiarity
is that the grantees were not the ones who were to retain the mineral
interest since that was owned by the grantors [the Wehners], who
would necessarily be the only persons who could be able to retain any
of the minerals since they owned them. Both the contract for deed and
the warranty deed had been recorded in 1950. Since that was done, the
tract became the property of the Schroeders, but the 50% mineral
interest was left somewhere in limbo because a contract for deed is not
a grant and does not actually convey an interest in land but simply is
a contractual promise to convey it via a warranty deed.
In 1981, the Wehners brought an action to reform their
warranty deed, stating that “second parties” was an error, and they
intended to have “first parties,” meaning themselves as the grantors in
the deed. They also asserted that the mineral reservation in the contract
for deed was omitted from the warranty deed due to an “innocent
mutual mistake” made by both of them and the Schroeders. Other
parties had acquired some interests, but it is not necessary to look into
that aspect. The district court found that a mutual mistake has been
made between the Wehners and the Schroeders regarding the omission
of the mineral reservation in the warranty deed, and this provided the
basis for approving a reformation of the document. The question of
reformation of a contract or other kind of document is often referred
to as a matter for the “equity” courts, as mentioned later in this article:
“A court of equity will grant relief by way of reformation of a written
instrument, resulting from mutual mistake where justice and good
conscience so dictate.”22 In affirming the grant of reformation from
the district court in Wehner v. Schroeder, the North Dakota Supreme
Court summarized as follows:
We believe that in order to bar reformation under these
particular circumstances, the fault of the party
22. Zabolotny v. Fedorenko, 315 N.W.2d 668, 671 (N.D. 1982) (citing Cokins
v. Frandsen, 141 N.W.2d. 796, 798 (N.D. 1966)).
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requesting relief must amount “to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards
of fair dealing.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
157 (1981)….The trial court found no evidence that the
Wehners failed to act in good faith or in accordance
with reasonable standards of fair dealing. We have
reviewed the record in this case and cannot say that the
trial court erred in this regard.
...
The trial court found that a mutual mistake had
occurred, and, as we stated earlier, that finding is not
clearly erroneous. The doctrine of merger therefore
does not bar reformation in this case.23
In the law of real property, the doctrine of merger stands for
the proposition that a contract for the conveyance of real property
merges into the related deed of conveyance:
One of the most firmly established common law
doctrines governing real property involves the merger
of rights stemming from a land sale contract into the
deed that consummates the transaction…. In essence,
because the deed is presumed to supersede all
preceding negotiations and agreements, all rights and
remedies of the parties in relation to the transaction
must be determined by the deed. Most practitioners
prepare real estate contracts with the belief that the
doctrine will apply and merge the provisions of the
contract in the deed.24
Therefore, any guarantees made in the contract that are not
reflected in the deed are extinguished when the deed is conveyed to
the buyer of the property. In other words, the Court seems to be saying
that the approved reformation in this case essentially blends the
contract and the warranty into a single entity, which was appropriate
in view of the approval of the claim for reformation. A number of other
cases seeking reformation of documents have been brought over the
23. Wehner, 354 N.W.2d at 679.
24. Barry M. Goldman, Common Law Doctrine of Merger: The Exceptions are
the Rule, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 19 (1983).
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years before the North Dakota Supreme Court, and there is one
opinion, granted in 1966, which seems particularly lucid in dealing
with this issue. In Cokins v. Frandsen, the issue arose when a buyer
and a seller entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of a
real estate tract on which a restaurant was located. In the course of an
engineering survey it was discovered that the description of the tract
in the agreement was erroneous. The buyers brought an action for
reformation to correct the instrument. At the outset, the Court stated
clearly the basic situation required in order for reformation to take
place:
In order that the court may order reformation of the
description of real estate in an instrument, it must
appear that there has been a mutual mistake. In other
words, it must be shown that, at the time of the
execution of the agreement to sell, both parties
intended to say something different from what was said
in the instrument. In such event, equity has the power
to reform the instrument to correct the mutual mistake
of the parties.25
The Court in Cokins, as opposed to some of the other cases,
determined that a mutual mistake had been by both the buyer and the
seller in drafting the purchase agreement, due to an error in the
description of the tract of land in question. Accordingly, this was an
appropriate case for the equitable relief of reformation:
There being a mutual mistake in the description, such
mutual mistake justifies the reformation of the
description in the purchase agreement, and the
judgment of the trial court granting reformation of the
description in the purchase agreement and the deed is
affirmed.26
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATION: CLOSING THE GATE
25. Cokins v. Frandsen, 141 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D. 1966) (citing Williams v.
Hebbard, 92 P.2d 657 (Cal. 1939)).
26. Id. at 800 (citing Wilson v. Pulsfut, 49 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1951)).
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As discussed above, the attempt to alter the contract and
warranty deed problem in the Western Energy quiet title action by
reformation based on mutual mistake failed due to a lack of any basis
for asserting a “mutual mistake.” The actual solution the district court
used, and the North Dakota Supreme Court approved, was the Statute
of Limitations. The extensive lapse of time during which there was no
complaint from Western Energy Corporation simply shut the matter
down insofar as seeking a reformation. As pointed out by the North
Dakota Supreme Court at the opening of its opinion, Western Energy
Corporation appealed from a district court judgment that found its
quiet title action to have been barred by applicable statutes of
limitation and laches, and the mineral interests at issue having been
awarded to the Stauffers. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment
was affirmed.
The term “laches” used in the Court’s statement is discussed
below. At this point, it is the statute of limitations that is the
determining factor. The North Dakota statute of limitations pertaining
to conveyances such as occurred in this case is N.D. Cent. Code Ann.
§ 28-01-15, labeled in the code volume as “Actions having ten-year
limitations.” There are several subsections to this statute, and the
Court cites § 28-01-15(2), as the district court had also done, which
provides that any legal action based on contracts or any other
instruments affecting title to real property must be commenced within
ten years following the time the claim for relief accrues. Accordingly,
since a substantial number of years more than ten had passed from the
delivery of the warranty deed in 1959 to the bringing of the quiet title
action by Western Energy in 2016—57 years—there was clearly no
question that the quiet title action must disappear, and the Stauffers
finally became established as the owners of the mineral interest in
question after what clearly appeared to be an extended period of
uncertainty and confusion.
The history of Statutes of Limitation is an interesting one. Such
principles developed first under English law and, as with many other
legal principles, gradually expanded to become parts of American law:
The principle [statutes of limitation] was first adopted
in English law in connection with actions for the
recovery of real property. . ..The various States
[American] possess their own statutes of limitation
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which are modeled in the main upon the English but
differ widely in their minor details.27
In fact, it has been pointed out that the concept of statutes of
limitation may actually be traced as far back as to ancient Greece, and
the first one to appear pertaining to real property actions under English
law was a 1487 statute enacted during the reign of King Henry VII.
The first such English statute was adopted by American colonies
before the 1776 Revolution and ultimately became the foundation of
nearly all subsequent American statutes of limitation.28
The statutes of limitation constitute a very useful factor in the
American legal system and by no means are they intended to provide
an easy way for courts to limit the number of cases that may be piling
up on the dockets. They have a definite purpose, which is clearly
reflected in the analysis and opinion of the Supreme Court in this case,
as well as in the same result originally reached in the district court.
The following summaries of the function and purpose of the statutes
of limitation demonstrate the underpinning of the clearly appropriate
result in this case:
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society,
and are favored in the law. They are found and
approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence.
They promote repose by giving security and stability to
human affairs; important public policy lies at their
foundation. Thy stimulate … activity and punish
negligence. While time is constantly destroying
evidence of rights, they supply its place by a
presumption which renders proof unnecessary. Mere
delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is itself a
conclusive bar.29
A good characterization for statutes of limitation is they
provide a kind of repose, preventing dubious claims from possibly
lingering forever in the judicial system:
27. Statute of limitations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed. 1953).
28. Tyler T. Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of
Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454 (1997).
29. Id. at 456 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
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The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, enacted
as a matter of public policy to fix a limit within which
an action must be brought, or the obligation is
presumed to have been paid, and is intended to run
against those who are neglectful of their rights, and
who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the
enforcement thereof….These statutes are declared to
be ‘among the most beneficial in our books’ ‘They rest
upon sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare
of society.’.…The underlying purpose of statutes of
limitation is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of
stale claims concerning which persons interested have
been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution.30
V. LACHES: AN OLD-TIMER IN LEGAL HISTORY BUT STILL ALIVE
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion in the Western
Energy case discussed above opens with a reference to the district
court judgment “finding its quiet title action to be barred by applicable
statutes of limitation and laches.” The actual holding was the action
was effectively barred by the statute of limitation. The word “laches”
is an old term that evolved from Latin (“laxus”) and Old French
(“laschesse”), meaning laxness, slackness, negligence, and the like,
usually in the course of legal matters. Laches is embedded in the legal
concept of “equity,” which has been described in a variety of ways. A
typical legal description of equity is:
In its broadest and most general signification, this term
[equity] denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness,
justness, and right dealing—the rule of doing to all
others as we desire them to do to us; or; as it is
expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm
nobody, to render to every man his due.”31

30. Id. (citing Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 326 (Cal. 1944)).
31. Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). (Justinian was, of
course the Byzantine emperor from A.D. 527 to 565, who compiled the famous book
of laws entitled the Justinian Code.).
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Having defined “equity,” we can see how the concept of
“laches” is embedded into the function of equity as an integral part of
the legal process carried on by the courts:
Generally speaking, laches is a defense in equity that
stands for the proposition that a court will not find for
the plaintiff if the plaintiff delayed in bringing the case,
and that delay harmed the defendant…. Accordingly,
laches has traditionally had two, or at most three,
components—delay, a position change for the worse,
and a loss of evidence.”32
Unreasonable delay in bringing an action before a court is not the sole
feature of laches but it establishes the fundamental basis of this
concept insofar as it affects an opposing party:
Laches is a delay or lapse of time in commencing an
action that works a disadvantage or prejudice to the
adverse party because of a change in conditions during
the delay.33
Laches does not arise from a delay or lapse of time
alone, and in addition to the time element, the party
against whom laches is sought to be invoked must be
actually or presumptively aware of his rights and must
fail to assert them against a party who in good faith
permitted his position to become so changed that he
could not be restored to his former state.34
In the historical legal context, laches came to be appropriated
by the English chancery courts, where decisions could be made by the
judges that were more flexible than what would be required under the
strict legal rules that had been established under the common law.35
32. Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 365 (2009).
33. Williams Cty. Soc. Servs. Bd. v. Falcon, 367 N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.D. 1985).
34. Burlington N., Inc. v. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233, 242 (N.D. 1982).
35. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22
(1989) (“Equity, however, had emerged in the colonies as a matter of practice, if not
of form. Seventeenth century colonial lay judges exercised a kind of equity through
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The basic outcome of the application of laches is that a legal right or
claim may not be enforced or allowed if an unreasonably long delay
in asserting the right or claim has prejudiced the other party.
Historically, there was a kind of connection between laches and
statutes of limitation, possibly on the theory that the mere passage of
enough delay in raising a claim of a mistake was sufficient for the
court to render a negative ruling. However, they are not the same, and
the court in the Western Energy case, while ruling on the basis of the
statute of limitations, was also ruling that the discrepancy between the
contract for deed and the warranty deed in that case was not enough to
establish the existence of a mutual mistake.
Laches is a defense that can be invoked when the
plaintiff has delayed in bringing a suit. But laches is not
concerned merely with the fact of delay. It matters why
the plaintiff delayed bringing the claim and what effect
that delay had on the defendant. In doctrinal terms, the
delay must be “unreasonable” and cause “prejudice.” It
is this focus on considerations other than the mere
passage of time that strongly distinguishes laches from
the statutes of limitations.36
Accordingly, there is a significant distinction between statutes
of limitation and the doctrine of laches when applied to a case such as
Western Energy, as reflected in the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
opinion in the case, and in the following statement:
“Laches, a term for slackness or negligence, used
particularly in law to signify negligence on the part of
a person in doing that which he is by law bound to do,
in allowing an unreasonable time to elapse in asserting
a right, seeking relief, or claiming a privilege. Statutes
of limitation specify the time within which various
the laxity with which they followed common law precedents.”). The chancellor, who
was the judge presiding over the chancery court, was entitled to modify the
application of strict legal rules and grant relief if that seemed appropriate in the
particular circumstances.
36. Samuel L. Bray. A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. 2 (2014), citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs,
LAW OF REMEDIES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 103 (2d ed. 2013).
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classes of actions may be brought, and various statutes
granting remedies, etc., impose a definite time within
which legal action must be taken.37
The concept of “equity” is mentioned a number of times
above, though it is not feasible to attempt to discuss it in depth here.
In a legal context, it suggests a system that recognizes that the law can
work, to a limited extent anyway, with a reasonable amount of
flexibility without damaging its authority. This was very well said
nearly 100 years ago, with regard to property, by the great American
legal scholar Roscoe Pound:
38

More and more the tendency is to hold that what the
law should secure is satisfaction of the owner’s
reasonable wants with respect to the property—that is
those which consist with the like wants of his neighbors
and the interests of society.39

37. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 27.
38. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 22, 25, 31 and 32.
39. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 186 (1921).

